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Theses
•	 The	 end	 of	 large-scale	 hostilities	 and	 the	 crushing	 of	 the	
armed	 underground	 resistance	 in	 Chechnya	 have,	 over	 the	
past	few	years,	led	to	a	stabilisation	of	the	situation	in	the	re-
public,	which	–	 alongside	 the	 improvements	 in	Russia’s	 eco-
nomic	 situation	 during	 the	 first	 period	 of	 Vladimir	 Putin’s	
government	–	has	become	a	symbol	of	 the	success	of	his	po-
litical	system.	However,	the	Chechen	issue	remains	one	of	the	
Russian	 Federation’s	 major	 political	 problems.	Moreover,	 in	
connection	with	the	activity	of	the	republic’s	leader1	Ramzan	
Kadyrov,	and	his	conflict	with	the	Russian	power	structures,	
the	importance	of	the	Chechen	problem,	together	with	ques-
tions	about	the	sustainability	of	the	peace	in	Chechnya,	have	
become	even	more	important	in	recent	months.
•	 The	face	of	Chechnya,	and	one	of	the	inseparable	symbols	of	
Vladimir	Putin’s	presidency,	is	now	Ramzan	Kadyrov,	the	dic-
tatorial	leader	of	the	republic,	whose	political	ambitions	run	
beyond	 the	 borders	 of	 Chechnya.	 The	 identification	 of	 con-
temporary	Chechnya	with	Kadyrov	derives	from	the	fact	that	
the	situation	in	the	republic	has	been	determined	for	the	last	
fifteen	years	by	the	informal	pact	concluded	at	the	beginning	
of	 the	 second	 Chechen	 war	 (1999/2000)	 between	 the	 Kady-
rovs	(first	Ahmad,	then	his	son	Ramzan)	and	Putin;	the	plan	
for	governing	Chechnya	which	 remains	valid	 to	 the	present	
day;	and	the	relationship	between	Moscow	and	Grozny.	In	ex-
change	 for	 stabilising	 the	 situation	 in	 the	 republic	 by	using	
any	and	all	means,	Kadyrov	has	received	a	guarantee	that	he	
can	remain	in	power,	obtain	regular	funding	from	the	federal	
budget,	and	have	a	free	hand	in	the	rule	of	Chechnya.
1	 From	2007-2011,	Kadyrov	held	the	title	of	President	of	Chechnya;	in	2011	he	
was	renamed	‘head	of	the	republic’,	as	was	done	in	other	entities	of	the	Rus-
sian	Federation	with	the	status	of	republic.
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•	 Vladimir	 Putin’s	 policy	 towards	 Chechnya	 has	 been	 dubbed	
‘Chechenisation’.	Its	most	important	result	from	the	Kremlin’s	
point	of	view	has	been	the	stabilisation	of	the	situation	in	the	
republic,	and	its	reconstruction	from	the	devastation	of	war.	
It	 has	 also	 led	 to	 the	 creation	 in	 the	 republic	 of	 the	dictato-
rial	regime	of	Kadyrov,	who	dominates	the	Chechen	political	
scene	and	has	pacified	society	by	applying	terror	and	a	whole	
spectrum	of	political,	economic	and	ideological	instruments.	
Apart	from	the	aforementioned,	short-term	effects,	Checheni-
sation	has	strengthened,	and	in	many	respects	even	acceler-
ated	the	socio-political	processes	which	had	been	taking	place	
in	Chechnya	since	 the	early	nineties:	 the	de-Russification	of	
the	 republic,	 its	 Islamisation,	 the	 strengthening	 of	Chechen	
nationalism,	and	nihilism	in	relation	to	the	Russian	legal	sys-
tem.	As	a	result,	Chechnya	has	evolved	into	a	civilisationally	
alien	enclave	within	the	Russian	Federation	which	lives	by	its	
own	rules,	a	kind	of	‘Chechen	world’	which	has	little	in	com-
mon	with	 the	 ‘Russian	world’	which	Vladimir	Putin’s	policy	
towards	the	post-Soviet	area	draws	on.
•	 The	political	activity	and	the	growing	independence	of	Ramzan	
Kadyrov,	the	increasing	conflicts	with	the	federal	authorities	
he	ostentatiously	ignores,	as	well	as	the	widespread	recogni-
tion	 of	 the	Chechen	 leader’s	 irreplaceability,	 raise	 questions	
about	his	 loyalty	 and	 the	possibility	 that	he	may	openly	 re-
nounce	 his	 obedience	 to	Moscow.	However,	 such	 a	 scenario	
seems	very	unlikely	due	to	the	Kadyrov	regime’s	dependence	
on	Russia.	 Its	financial	dependence,	 the	stigma	of	collabora-
tion	and	the	crimes	he	has	committed	against	his	own	people,	
all	of	which	are	heavy	burdens	 for	Kadyrov,	ensure	 that	his	
regime	cannot	continue	to	exist	without	the	support	of	Russia.
•	 From	the	Kremlin’s	point	of	view,	the	Kadyrov	problem	is	com-
pensated	for	by	his	usefulness,	which	goes	beyond	simply	en-
suring	stability	in	Chechnya.	Kadyrov	and	the	military	units	
subordinate	to	him	are	a	convenient	tool,	both	in	the	Kremlin’s	
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hands	in	its	internal	policy	and	within	the	larger	framework	
of	 Russian	 foreign	 policy.	 Inside	 Russia	 and	 the	 post-Soviet	
area,	Chechens	play	a	deterrent	 role,	 and	are	 seen	as	brutal	
and	 ruthless	 ‘henchmen	 of	 Putin’	 who	 can	 be	 used	 against	
opponents	of	 the	authoritarian	rule	or	opponents	of	Russia’s	
rapprochement	with	the	countries	of	the	former	USSR.	In	the	
Middle	East,	in	turn,	an	Islamic	Chechnya	constitutes	a	kind	
of	‘visiting	card’	for	an	Islam-friendly	Russia.
•	 Kadyrov’s	dependent	relationship	and	the	unlikelihood	of	his	
renouncing	his	obedience	to	Moscow,	however,	does	not	mean	
that	 the	 Chechenisation	 policy	 has	 brought	 lasting	 peace	 in	
Chechnya,	 or	 that	 President	 Putin	 has	 successfully	 resolved	
the	 Chechen	 issue.	 The	 current	 plan	 for	 governing	 a	 stable	
Chechnya	and	the	relationship	between	Moscow	and	Grozny	
is	 a	 temporary	 solution,	 which	 does	 not	 have	 a	 sustainable	
basis,	and	is	in	fact	based	on	a	situational	convergence	of	in-
terests	between	Putin	and	Kadyrov.	A	change	of	power	in	the	
Kremlin	–	and	to	an	even	greater	extent	an	internal	crisis	in	
Russia,	weakening	Russia’s	positions	in	the	Caucasus	–	would	
effectively	mean	the	fall	of	Kadyrov’s	regime	(which	is	mainly	
based	on	terror	and	not	public	support),	and	the	reactivation	
of	 calls	 for	 independence	 in	 Chechnya.	 Due	 to	 the	 strength	
and	 deep	 roots	 of	 the	 Chechen	national	 liberation	 idea,	 and	
the	likelihood	of	an	internal	crisis	in	Russia	in	the	shorter	or	
longer	term,	the	above	scenario	seems	inevitable.
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I. The PuTIn–Kadyrov PacT
Vladimir	Putin	 inherited	 the	unresolved	problem	of	Chechnya	
from	Boris	Yeltsin.	Throughout	the	1990s	Chechnya	was	a	sym-
bol	 of	 collapse,	 a	 synonym	 for	 the	 humiliation	 of	 the	 Russian	
state	that	had	lost	the	military	and	political	confrontation	with	
militants	 fighting	 to	 create	 an	 independent	 Chechen	 state2.	
Dealing	 with	 the	 problem	 of	 Chechen	 separatism,	 which	 was	
destabilising	the	whole	North	Caucasus	and	threatening	the	ter-
ritorial	integrity	of	the	Russian	Federation	was	therefore	a	chal-
lenge	of	existential	importance	to	Putin,	who	began	the	process	
while	 still	 prime	 minister.	 In	 the	 first	 months	 of	 the	 second	
Chechen	war,	which	began	 in	 the	 late	 summer	and	autumn	of	
1999,	and	was	conducted	under	 the	banner	of	 the	fight	against	
international	 Islamist	 terrorism,	 the	actions	of	Russian	 troops	
did	not	differ	 from	those	of	 1994-1996	 (the	 introduction	of	 fed-
eral	troops	into	the	republic,	massive	bombing,	the	pacification	
of	rebel-held	areas).	Unlike	 in	 the	first	Chechen	war,	however,	
the	Russian	forces	defeated	the	militants’	key	divisions	within	
a	 few	months,	and	took	control	over	 the	territory	of	 the	whole	
republic,	although	they	did	not	break	the	resistance	of	the	nu-
merous	guerrilla	groups.
The	 guerrillas’	 military	 defeat	 obliged	 the	 Kremlin	 to	 rule	
Chechen	 territory	 directly.	 Contrary	 to	 expectations,	 Putin’s	
administration	 rejected	 both	 cooperation	 with	 the	 tradition-
ally	pro-Russian	Chechen	groups	(activists	mainly	derived	from	
the	 communist	 nomenklatura,	 who	 opposed	 the	 independence	
movement)	and	a	policy	of	occupation,	that	is,	putting	Chechnya	
2	 Moscow	lost	control	over	Chechnya	in	1991.	In	1994-1996	the	so-called	first	
Chechen	war	was	fought,	which	ended	with	the	signing	of	agreements	in	
Khasavyurt	(31	August	1996),	which	effectively	represented	the	Kremlin’s	
admission	of	defeat.	The	agreement	signed	by	representatives	of	the	Rus-
sian	authorities	and	the	militants	was	based	on	recognition	of	the	latter’s	
authority	in	the	republic,	the	withdrawal	of	federal	troops,	and	a	start	to	
negotiations	on	the	future	status	of	Chechnya.
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under	 the	 jurisdiction	 of	 the	 federal	 power	 structures,	 which	
had	lobbied	hard	for	this	solution,	and	indeed	tried	to	sabotage	
the	Kremlin’s	policy.	Unexpectedly,	some	former	leaders	of	the	
independence	movement	became	the	Russian	authorities’	part-
ners	 in	 Chechnya,	 either	 for	 opportunistic	 or	 ideological	 rea-
sons	(as	they	opposed	the	Islamic	radicalism	which	was	begin-
ning	to	dominate	among	the	armed	guerrillas3),	as	they	decided	
to	 collaborate	with	 the	 Russian	 authorities.	 The	 leader	 of	 this	
group	was	the	then	mufti	of	the	republic	Ahmad	Kadyrov,	who	
had	been	the	key	and	de facto	sole	partner	of	Vladimir	Putin	in	
Chechnya	(after	Ahmad’s	death	in	2004	he	was	replaced	by	his	
son	 Ramzan).	 The	 other	 Chechen	 political	 groups	 have	 been	
moved	 into	 the	 shadows	and	marginalised,	 including	Chechen	
politicians	 and	 commanders	 affiliated	 with	 the	 federal	 power	
structures	(such	as	Bislan	Gantamirov).
It	was	with	Ahmad	Kadyrov	that	Putin	concluded	an	informal	ar-
rangement	during	the	first	few	months	of	the	second	Chechen	war	
(at	the	turn	of	2000),	the	terms	of	which	both	parties	have	so	far	
strictly	adhered	to.	The	agreement	was	a	plan	for	the	governance	
of	Chechnya	and	the	nature	of	the	relationship	between	Moscow	
and	Grozny.	In	exchange	for	ensuring	stability	in	the	republic	by	
using	 any	means	 he	 felt	 necessary,	 Kadyrov	 received	 power	 in	
Chechnya	(initially	as	head	of	the	administration,	and	from	2003	
as	president),	which	was	granted	him	as	a	kind	of	fief,	which	he	
could	manage	at	his	own	discretion.	 In	addition,	Moscow	guar-
anteed	the	stable	funding	necessary	for	the	economic	reconstruc-
tion	of	the	republic,	and	guaranteed	a	minimum	subsistence	level	
for	its	residents.
3	 Rhetoric	calling	for	the	transformation	of	Chechnya	into	an	Islamic	state	and	
for	secular	law	to	be	replaced	by	sharia	began	to	gain	popularity	in	1996-1999,	
when	the	republic	remained	outside	the	control	of	the	federal	government.	
During	the	second	Chechen	war,	the	armed	underground	underwent	an	ideo-
logical	evolution	from	the	struggle	for	national	liberation	to	jihad,	which	cul-
minated	in	the	symbolic	liquidation	of	Chechen	Republic	of	Ichkeria	and	the	
proclamation	of	the	Caucasus	Emirate	by	Dokka	Umarov	in	October	2007.
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The	Kremlin’s	policy	toward	Chechnya	has	been	dubbed	‘Chech-
enisation’.	It	has	been	implemented	in	several	stages,	and	has	in-
volved	the	progressive	transfer	of	competences	and	control	over	
the	 republic	 to	 the	Chechen	authorities,	while	 limiting	 the	 in-
fluence	of	the	federal	authorities,	particularly	the	law	enforce-
ment	 agencies4.	 The	 symbolic	 culmination	 of	 this	 process	was	
the	 abolition	 of	 the	 counter-terrorist	 operation	 regime	 in	 the	
republic	 in	 March	 2009.	 Both	 Chechenisation	 and	 the	 Putin–
Kadyrov	pact	have	come	under	repeated	threat.	The	most	seri-
ous	crisis	arose	after	the	death	of	Ahmad	Kadyrov	in	a	terrorist	
attack	at	a	stadium	in	Grozny	in	May	2004,	for	which	the	Rus-
sian	power	structures,	dissatisfied	with	 the	 limitation	of	 their	
power	in	Chechnya,	were	most	probably	responsible5.	Vladimir	
Putin,	however,	decided	to	continue	the	current	policy,	and	des-
ignated	 as	 Ahmad’s	 successor	 his	 son,	 Ramzan,	 then	 an	 inex-
perienced	 28-year-old6.	 Despite	 initial	 concerns	 about	 his	 lack	
of	 independence	 and	 experience,	 the	 younger	Kadyrov	proved	
to	be	an	equally	effective	politician,	who	in	his	actions	has	not	
violated	any	of	the	basic	conditions	of	his	deal	with	the	Russian	
president.
Another	 threat	 to	 the	 Chechenisation	 policy	 came	 from	 the	
repeated	terrorist	attacks	in	Russia	and	actions	organised	by	the	
4	 The	policy	of	Chechenisation	is	sometimes	mistakenly	defined	as	an	attempt	
to	‘Chechenise’	the	conflict,	that	is,	to	change	its	character	from	Russian/
Chechen	to	an	internal	Chechen	conflict.
5	 See	for	example	Viktor	Uvierov,	Kto	ubil	Kadyrova?,	http://analysisclub.ru/
index.php?page=putin1&art=1391;	Mairbek	Taramov,	Kto	ubil	Akhmada	Kady-
rova?,	http://www.kackad.com/article.asp?article=542;	Yelena	Rudnieva,	Biez	
uchastiya	spietssluzhb	Kadyrova	bylo	nie	likvidirovat’,	http://www.gazeta.ru/	
2004/07/19/oa_127444.shtml;	also	the	interview	with	journalist	Yulia	Latynina,	
http://www.yulialatynina.by.ru/publ/echomsk2004-08-21.htm
6	 The	live	broadcast	of	a	meeting	between	Putin	and	a	tearful	Ramzan	Kadyrov	
dressed	in	a	tracksuit	at	the	Kremlin,	a	few	hours	after	the	death	of	Ah-
mad	Kadyrov,	has	gone	into	history.	It	was	an	unequivocal	signal	that	the	
policy	of	Chechenisation	would	continue.	See	https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=B7_7IUYSuGQ
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underground	forces7,	which	unleashed	waves	of	criticism	of	both	
the	 Kremlin’s	 policy	 towards	 Chechnya,	 and	 the	 authorities	 in	
Grozny,	who	were	accused	of	inefficiency	in	their	fight	against	the	
guerrillas.
7	 In	particular,	the	attacks	which	occurred	during	mass	hostage-takings,	for	
example	at	the	Dubrovka	theatre	in	Moscow	in	October	2002,	or	in	Beslan,	
North	Ossetia	in	September	2004.
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II. The effecTs of chechenIsaTIon
1. stabilisation
From	 the	Kremlin’s	 point	 of	 view,	 the	most	 important	 result	 of	
the	Putin–Kadyrov	pact	and	the	last	fifteen	years	of	the	Chechnya	
policy	has	been	the	stabilisation	of	the	situation	in	the	republic.	
Paradoxically,	this	has	proceeded	in	parallel	with	the	weakening	
influence	of	the	federal	power	structures	and	the	strengthening	
of	Kadyrov’s	 power,	 the	best	 proof	 of	which	 is	 the	 constant	 fall	
in	the	figures	on	armed	incidents	and	victims	of	violence8.	This	
stabilisation	 has	 been	 possible	 thanks	 to	 Kadyrov’s	 application	
(with	the	Kremlin’s	approval)	of	an	entire	spectrum	of	political,	
military,	 economic	 and	 ideological	measures	which	 have	 led	 to	
the	marginalisation	 and	 gradual	 crushing	 of	 the	 armed	under-
ground	resistance.	One	such	move	involved	bringing	those	active	
or	former	combatants	who	supported	the	ideas	of	independence,	
but	opposed	the	establishment	of	a	Caucasian	Emirate,	over	to	the	
Chechen	authorities’	side9.	This	was	possible	thanks	to	the	prom-
ulgation	of	a	 succession	of	amnesties,	 and	by	 the	Kadyrovs	 (the	
process	was	 begun	 by	Ahmad	 and	 continued	 by	 Ramzan)	win-
ning	 over	 individuals	 and	 armed	 groups	 following	negotiations	
and	 giving	 them	 personal	 guarantees.	 Most	 of	 the	 amnestied	
8	 See	Maciej	Falkowski,	On	the	periphery	of	global	jihad.	The	North	Caucasus:	
the	illusion	of	stabilisation,	OSW,	Point of View,	November	2014,	http://www.
osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/point-view/2014-11-14/periphery-global-jihad-north-
caucasus-illusion-stabilisation
9	 The	Caucasian	Emirate	(CE),	for	the	creation	of	which	the	militants	are	fight-
ing,	is	ultimately	to	become	an	Islamic	state	covering	all	the	republics	of	the	
North	Caucasus	and	a	large	part	of	the	Stavropol	and	Krasnodar	krais.	It	is	
currently	an	underground	military	organisation.
Since	the	second	half	of	2013,	 it	has	been	undergoing	a	serious	ideological	
and	organisational	crisis	associated	with	the	abandonment	of	its	ranks	by	
many	commanders	and	troops,	and	 its	declaration	of	allegiance	 to	 the	 Is-
lamic	State.	In	June	2015,	even	Aslan	Biutukayev,	commander	of	all	the	fight-
ers	in	Chechnya,	renounced	his	allegiance	to	the	Emirate,	which	means	that	
the	latter’s	activity	is	now	de facto	limited	to	the	mountains	of	Dagestan.	See	
http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/263915/
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militants	 did	 not	 actually	 lay	 down	 their	 weapons,	 but	 began	
serving	 in	 various	 armed	 formations	 within	 Chechnya,	 which	
were	 formally	 part	 of	 Russian	 structures	 (mainly	 the	 Interior	
Ministry)	but	were	in	fact	subordinate	to	Kadyrov10.	At	the	same	
time,	violent	measures	were	taken	against	those	who	continued	
to	resist:	murder,	torture,	reprisals	against	relatives	(taking	them	
as	hostages,	 demolishing	 their	 houses,	 etc.).	 The	 terror	used	 by	
the	Kadyrovs	(Ramzan	in	particular;	Ahmad	tended	to	use	milder	
methods)	 was	 significantly	more	 effective	 than	 that	 which	 the	
Russian	power	structures	resorted	to;	it	was	targeted	specifically,	
and	did	not	involve	the	blind	repression	resulting	from	hatred	of	
the	Chechens	used	by	the	Russian	power	structures.
The	economic	measures	employed	were	also	significant:	the	eco-
nomic	 reconstruction	 (based	 on	 federal	 subsidies)	 of	 the	whole	
republic	(not	just	Grozny,	but	also	other	areas)	from	the	devasta-
tion	of	war;	and	 the	guarantee	of	basic	 living	standards	 for	 the	
population	(for	example	by	creating	jobs	in	administration	or	the	
power	 structures,	 paying	 compensation	 for	 property	 destroyed	
during	the	war,	etc.).	At	the	same	time,	the	Chechen	authorities	
put	up	no	obstacles	to	people	wishing	to	emigrate	(in	recent	years	
tens	of	thousands	of	people	have	left	Chechnya,	mainly	heading	
to	Europe11),	reducing	the	social	problems	resulting	from	the	dif-
ficult	economic	situation	(mainly	from	an	unemployment	rate	of	
around	30%).
10	 Currently,	the	largest	Chechen	armed	formations	include:	the	so-called	oil	
regiment	of	Chechnya’s	Interior	Ministry	(around	3000	troops),	the	special	
regiment	of	Chechnya’s	Interior	Ministry	(around	1800),	the	Northern	and	
Southern	battalions	(part	of	the	46th	brigade	of	the	Interior	troops	of	the	Rus-
sian	Interior	Ministry	stationed	in	the	Republic;	around	2000),	two	special	
patrol	regiments	(around	3000),	two	special	companies	with	the	42nd	Mecha-
nised	Division	(around	500),	the	Chechen	OMON	(special	divisions	of	the	
militia;	around	300	officials),	Kadyrov’s	personal	protection	(around	500);	
and	Chechen	police	(around	9000	troops).
11	 According	to	estimates,	there	are	over	100,000	Russian	citizens	of	Chechen	
nationality	 in	 the	EU,	mostly	 in	Austria,	France,	Germany,	Belgium	and	
Poland;	http://www.ecre.org/component/downloads/downloads/161.html;	
https://iwpr.net/global-voices/integration-hard-road-young-chechen-men
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The	ideological	and	religious	dimension	of	Kadyrov’s	policy	is	no	less	
important.	Although	he	has	abandoned	 the	pro-independence	 slo-
gans	and	proudly	proclaims	himself	pro-Russian,	the	foundation	of	
the	ideology	he	promotes	is	nationalism	(pride	in	being	a	Chechen,	
a	sense	of	superiority	towards	other	cultures)	and	the	Sufi	version	
of	 Islam,	contrasted	with	 ‘Wahhabism’12.	The	promotion	of	an	 ide-
alised	 ‘Chechenity’	 (in	 the	 dimensions	 of	 propaganda	 and	 practi-
cal	example,	for	example	by	developing	the	Chechen	language),	the	
cult	of	violence	and	the	patriarchal	culture,	the	Islamisation	of	so-
ciety,	as	well	as	Kadyrov’s	ostentatious	religiosity,	all	correspond	to	
social	expectations,	contributing	to	a	weakening	of	support	for	the	
armed	 underground,	 and	 strengthening	 Kadyrov’s	 own	 position.
2. The establishment of Kadyrov’s dictatorship
Another	effect	of	Kadyrov’s	activities	has	been	the	formation	 in	
Chechnya	 of	 an	 authoritarian	 political	 regime.	Kadyrov	 has	 ef-
fectively	got	 rid	of	political	 rivals	and	social	 activists,	 either	by	
bringing	them	over	to	his	side	(for	example	Magomed	Khanbiyev,	
the	former	defence	minister	of	Ichkeria),	having	them	murdered	
(for	example	the	leaders	of	Chechen	clans,	and	the	leaders	of	pow-
er	structures	who	were	independent	of	Kadyrov,	such	as	Ruslan	
and	Sulim	Yamadayev	and	Movladi	Baysarov,	and	human	rights	
defenders	such	as	Natalia	Estemirova13),	or	forcing	them	not	to	in-
12	 Sufism	is	a	mystical	movement	in	Islam	strongly	rooted	in	the	Caucasus,	
which	manifests	itself	outwardly	in	the	activities	of	Sufi	brotherhoods	(in	
Chechnya,	mainly	the	Qadiriyya	brotherhoods).	In	the	former	USSR,	it	is	
described	as	a	so-called	‘traditional	Islam’,	opposed	to	Salafism.	Salafism	for	
its	part	is	called	a	religious	movement	within	Sunni	Islam	which	stresses	the	
need	for	religious	and	moral	rebirth	within	the	spirit	of	‘pure’	Islam	(that	is,	
one	based	solely	on	the	Qur’an	and	classical	Sunni	traditions).	In	the	post-
Soviet	area	Salafism	is	often	identified	with	Wahhabism,	understood	not	as	
a	historical	school	of	Koranic	law	and	political	movement	in	Saudi	Arabia,	
but	rather	as	a	synonym	for	terrorism.
13	 Ruslan	Yamadayev,	a	deputy	to	the	Russian	Duma	and	the	leader	of	the	Yama-
dayev	brothers’	clan	which	competed	with	Kadyrov,	was	shot	dead	in	Moscow	
in	September	2008.	Sulim	Yamadayev	was	assassinated	in	Dubai	(March	
2009),	and	Movladi	Baysarov	was	shot	in	Moscow	in	November	2006.	Mean-
while	Natalya	Estemirova,	a	member	of	the	Russian	Memorial	group	who	
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terfere	in	the	internal	affairs	of	the	republic	(for	example,	Chech-
en	politicians	whose	roots	lie	in	the	old	party	nomenklatura,	such	
as	Aslambek	Aslakhanov	and	Dokku	Zavgayev,	or	Said-Magomed	
Kakiyev,	the	commander	of	the	‘Zapad’	battalion	which	was	dis-
solved	 under	 pressure	 from	 Kadyrov).	 Kadyrov	 has	 also	 estab-
lished	 cooperation	 with	 influential	 Chechen	 businessmen	 in	
Moscow	(such	as	Umar	Jabrailov	and	Ruslan	Baysarov),	who	have	
co-financed	a	number	of	investments	in	the	republic,	but	do	not	
have	any	political	influence.	Political	life	in	Chechnya	is	now	sub-
ordinate	 to	Kadyrov,	who	 exercises	power	with	 the	 aid	 of	 loyal	
and	dependent	power	structures,	officials	and	Muslim	clergy14.	It	
is	also	significant	that	several	key	positions	in	the	administration	
and	security	structures	have	been	occupied	by	Kadyrov’s	relatives	
or	people	from	his	native	village	of	Tsentoroy/Khosi-yurt	(for	ex-
ample	 the	 Prime	 Minister	 Abubakar	 Edelgeriyev,	 the	 Chechen	
deputy	to	the	Russian	State	Duma	Adam	Delimkhanov,	the	head	
of	the	Chechen	Interior	Ministry	Ruslan	Alkhanov,	and	the	mayor	
of	Grozny	Islam	Kadyrov).
By	 terrorising	 the	population	with	 the	 aid	of	 armed	 subordinate	
units	and	the	use	of	denunciations	on	a	massive	scale,	and	exploit-
ing	the	Chechen	population’s	fatigue	at	the	long-lasting	war,	Kady-
rov	has	sowed	fear,	apathy	and	conviction	of	the	futility	of	opposing	
his	rule	among	the	public.	The	pacification	of	society	has	facilitated	
a	crackdown	on	 independent	human	rights	organisations	which,	
under	pressure	from	the	authorities	in	Grozny	(often	in	the	form	
had	criticised	Kadyrov	and	systematically	disclosed	crimes	committed	in	
Chechnya,	was	murdered	in	Grozny	in	July	2009.	Ramzan	Kadyrov’s	people	
were	probably	behind	all	of	these	murders.
14	 The	Spiritual	Board	of	Muslims	of	Chechnya,	run	by	Salakh	Mejiyev,	is	a	de 
facto	state	body,	whose	activity	is	entirely	subordinate	to	Kadyrov.	At	the	same	
time	its	influence	continues	to	grow;	it	controls	all	the	mosques	in	the	republic,	
and	its	imams	and	Islamic	judges	(the	kadi	of	their	respective	regions)	have	
great	influence	on	politics	at	the	local	level,	which	is	also	associated	with	the	
increased	importance	of	sharia	in	Chechnya.	One	of	the	important	activities	
of	the	muftiyat	is	brokering	negotiations	between	warring	clans,	with	the	aim	
of	reconciling	them	and	getting	them	to	abandon	vendettas.
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of	 brutal	 violence,	 smashing	 up	 offices	 etc.),	 have	 been	 forced	 to	
stop	operating	on	the	republic’s	territory	(such	as	the	Russia-wide	
Memorial	organisation	and	the	Committee	Against	Torture15).	The	
lack	 of	 any	 response	 from	 the	 Russian	 authorities	 to	 the	 above-
mentioned	actions,	which	have	mostly	been	carried	out	under	the	
propaganda	shield	of	the	‘battle’	with	a	pro-Western	‘fifth	column’,	
indicates	that	they	have	met	with	the	approval	of	the	Kremlin.
Realising	the	importance	of	information	policy,	Kadyrov	has	sub-
jugated	the	republic’s	media	(especially	the	TV	channels)	to	him,	
and	they	are	now	mainly	engaged	–	apart	from	promoting	Chech-
en	nationalism	–	in	reporting	on	his	activities,	and	spreading	the	
cult	of	the	leader	of	Chechnya	and	his	father16.
Kadyrov	 has	 also	 taken	 control	 over	 the	 republic’s	 economy,	
Chechen	business	and	Chechen	organised	crime	throughout	Rus-
sia	(and	possibly	even	outside	its	borders).	Key	companies	in	the	
republic	have	been	taken	over	by	Kadyrov’s	people	(outside	the	oil	
sector,	which	remains	 in	 federal	hands17),	and	a	number	of	new	
15	 The	last	human	rights	organisation	in	Chechnya	which	had	to	cease	its	ac-
tivities	was	the	Chechen	branch	of	Committee	Against	Torture	(http://www.
pytkam.net),	led	by	Igor	Kalapin.	Following	the	publication	on	the	Internet	of	
‘The	Family’,	a	film	critical	of	Kadyrov,	by	the	Open	Russia	opposition	organi-
sation	(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T5PnqcYFCTg;	representatives	
of	the	Committee	spoke	in	the	film)	a	crowd	stirred	up	and	manipulated	by	
the	Chechen	authorities	broke	up	the	Committee’s	office	in	Grozny.	See	http://
www.gazeta.ru/social/2015/06/03/6744098.shtml
16	 The	cult	of	personality	 in	contemporary	Chechnya	has	 taken	on	bizarre	
forms,	and	in	this	respect	the	republic	is	beginning	to	resemble	Turkmeni-
stan.	The	names	of	Ahmad	Kadyrov	or	his	wife	Ajman	have	been	given	to	
a	number	of	institutions,	buildings,	roads,	and	even	mosques	(in	clear	vio-
lation	of	Islamic	doctrine).	Another	manifestation	of	the	cult	of	Ramzan’s	
father	was	the	decision	to	transfer	the	anniversary	of	the	deportation	of	
Chechens	to	Central	Asia	from	23	February	(Defenders	of	the	Fatherland	
Day	in	Russia;	the	deportations	began	on	23	February	1944)	to	10	May	(the	
anniversary	of	the	death	of	Ahmad	Kadyrov);	this	was	particularly	offensive	
to	the	Chechens’	sense	of	national	pride.
17	 The	Chechen	oil	sector	is	controlled	by	the	Grozneftegaz	company,	created	
in	2000.	51%	of	its	shares	are	owned	by	Rosneft,	and	49%	by	the	Chechen	
government,	which	in	reality	has	no	influence	on	Grozneftegaz.
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business	projects	have	been	created	(such	as	the	Grozny	Avia	air-
lines,	 various	 construction	 companies18,	 and	 the	 Terek	 Grozny	
football	 club).	However,	 the	 income	 from	 economic	 activities	 is	
not	 the	main	 economic	 resource	 of	 Kadyrov’s	 financial	 empire.	
This	relies	on	subsidies	from	the	Russian	budget19	and	the	‘alter-
native	tax	system’,	which	consists	of	extorting	protection	money	
from	 Chechen	 businessmen	 (including	 those	 living	 outside	 the	
republic),	 officials,	 bureaucrats	 etc.,	 which	 is	 then	 transferred	
to	the	Ahmad	Kadyrov	Foundation	created	in	2007.	The	Founda-
tion’s	budget	is	the	de facto	alternative	budget	of	Chechnya,	but	it	
is	not	bound	by	the	rule	of	law:	the	proceeds	accumulated	are	used	
by	the	Chechen	leadership	both	for	private	business	investment	
(construction,	 the	renovation	of	 facilities	 such	as	mosques	both	
within	the	republic	and	abroad)	and	charity	(providing	support	
to	poor	families,	invalids,	etc.)20.
3. chechnya: a foreign enclave within the russian 
federation
The	 results	 of	 the	 Chechenisation	 policy,	 which	was	 intended	
more	to	isolate	Chechnya	within	Russia	rather	than	integrate	it	
with	 the	rest	of	 the	Russian	Federation,	go	 far	beyond	the	sta-
bilisation	 of	 the	 situation	 in	 the	 republic	 and	 the	 creation	 of	
a	dictatorial	regime.	Under	Kadyrov,	a	kind	of	 ‘Chechen	world’	
18	 Construction	companies	linked	to	Kadyrov	bring	enormous	profits	in	connec-
tion	with	the	reconstruction	of	the	republic	funded	from	the	federal	budget,	
as	well	as	the	implementation	of	huge	investment	projects	such	as	the	Grozny	
City	complex	(several	skyscrapers	in	the	city	centre	including	hotels,	luxury	
condominiums,	offices	et	al.;	see	http://grozny-city.com/index.php/en/)	and	
giant	mosques	in	cities	like	Grozny,	Urus-Martan,	Argun	and	others.
19	 In	2014,	Chechnya	received	a	total	of	56.8	billion	roubles	from	the	Russian	
budget,	which	accounted	for	81.6%	of	the	republic’s	budget	(around	41,000	
roubles	per capita);	for	comparison,	neighbouring	Dagestan	received	63	bil-
lion	(21,000	roubles	per capita),	which	accounted	for	70%	of	the	republic’s	
budget,	and	Ingushetia	20	billion	(45,000	roubles	per capita),	which	accounted	
for	85%	of	the	budget.	http://info.minfin.ru/subj_analitics.php
20	 For	more	information	about	the	foundation’s	activities,	see	Grigoriy	Tumanov,	
Robota	na	vznos,	Kommersant,	http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2736101
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has	been	created	–	a	purely	Chechen,	civilisationally	and	cultur-
ally	alien	enclave	within	Russia,	governed	by	its	own	rules	and	
living	its	own	life.	Although	Chechnya	is	a	part	of	the	political	
and	constitutional	framework	of	the	Russian	state,	it	is	ceasing	
to	be	a	part	of	the	‘Russian	world’,	closing	itself	away	within	its	
own	hermetic	culture,	 traditions	and	customs.	Under	Kadyrov	
Chechen	national	 identity	and	Chechen	nationalism	have	been	
strengthened.	The	Chechen	language	is	gaining	in	importance,	
as	it	has	moved	from	the	private	to	the	public	sphere	(in	Soviet	
times	and	during	the	first	years	after	the	collapse	of	the	USSR,	
the	use	of	Russian	predominated	 in	public	 life;	 this	 is	 still	 the	
case	in	the	neighbouring	republics	of	the	North	Caucasus).	Ex-
amples	of	this	are	the	meetings	of	the	republic’s	cabinet,	conduct-
ed	in	the	Chechen	language	(and	as	such	are	incomprehensible	
to	the	Russian	authorities),	or	statements	by	officials	(including	
Kadyrov)	to	local	media,	which	are	not	translated	into	Russian.	
The	Islamisation	of	society	is	also	deepening,	and	Islam	has	–	be-
sides	nationalism	–	become	not	only	a	key	component	of	Chechen	
identity,	but	also	 the	regulator	of	 family	and	social	 life.	At	 the	
same	time,	demodernisation	on	the	social	level	is	being	followed	
by	 a	 return	 to	 archaic	 traditions	 and	 customary	 rights	 (clan-
based	revenge,	kidnapping	women	for	marriage,	etc.),	wherein	it	
is	often	difficult	to	draw	a	clear	boundary	between	what	is	tradi-
tionally	Chechen	practice	and	what	is	Islamic	(such	as	polygamy,	
which	had	not	formerly	been	practiced	by	Chechens,	but	which	
is	widespread	 today).	These	 social	 processes	 are	 largely	 a	 con-
tinuation	of	earlier	trends,	which	can	be	traced	to	the	effects	of	
the	two	Chechen	wars	(mainly	the	transformation	of	Chechnya	
into	 an	 ethnically	 and	 religiously	homogenous	 republic21),	 and	
which	the	process	of	Chechenisation	has	only	strengthened	and	
de facto	sanctioned.
21	 While	Russians	accounted	for	around	30%	of	residents	of	the	Chechen-Ingush	
Autonomous	Soviet	Socialist	Republic	in	1989	(http://demoscope.ru/weekly/
ssp/rus_nac_89.php?reg=49),	in	2010	they	were	no	more	than	2%	of	the	popu-
lation	of	Chechnya,	and	0.7%	of	Ingushetia	(http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/
new_site/perepis2010/croc/Documents/Vol4/pub-04-04.pdf).
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Chechnya’s	alienation	within	Russia	is	proceeding	not	only	on	the	
social	level,	but	also	within	the	institutional	and	legal	sphere.	Al-
though	Russian	courts	operate	and	federal	legislation	formally	ap-
plies	 in	Chechnya,	 the	republic	 is	de facto	governed	by	a	mixture	
of	 Chechen	 customary	 laws	 (adats),	 sharia	 and	 the	 rule	 of	 force.	
Moreover,	the	Chechen	authorities	(especially	Kadyrov	himself)	do	
not	even	try	to	hide	their	ignorance	of	the	Russian	legal	order,	and	
prioritise	Chechen	customary	rights	and	 Islamic	norms22.	Exam-
ples	of	such	activities	include	the	promotion	of	polygamy,	ordering	
women	to	wear	Islamic	dress	in	offices	and	colleges	(headscarves,	
long	skirts,	shirts	covering	shoulders),	prohibiting	smoking	during	
Ramadan,	and	introducing	restrictions	on	the	sale	of	alcohol.	Some	
of	 Kadyrov’s	 statements,	 publicised	 in	 the	 Russian	 media,	 also	
stand	in	sharp	contrast	to	the	Russian	legal	system,	such	as	his	an-
nouncement	of	reprisals	against	the	relatives	of	militants	(demoli-
tion	of	their	houses,	banishment	from	the	republic23),	and	his	order	
to	open	fire	on	troops	of	the	security	structures	from	other	entities	
of	 the	Russian	Federation	who	enter	Chechnya	without	 the	prior	
agreement	of	the	Chechen	authorities24.
22	 One	example	of	a	clear	violation	of	federal	law	was	the	case,	widely	reported	
in	Russia,	of	the	wedding	between	17-year-old	Luisa	Goylabiyeva	and	Nazhud	
Guchigov,	the	46-year-old	chief	of	police	of	Nozhai-yurt	village.	Although	
the	wedding	was	technically	a	crime	in	the	light	of	Russian	law	(it	occurred	
as	a	result	of	pressure	from	the	chief	of	police	on	the	family	of	the	girl,	who	
would	become	his	second	wife),	Kadyrov	openly	supported	Guchigov,	and	
even	attended	the	wedding.	A	few	days	later,	Kadyrov’s	influential	head	of	
administration,	Magomed	Daudov	proposed	in	an	interview	for	the	portal	
Gazeta.ru	 that	polygamy	should	be	 legalised	 in	Russia.	See	http://www.
gazeta.ru/social/2015/05/18/6692937.shtml
23	 Numerous	instances	of	the	homes	of	militants’	relatives	being	destroyed	and	
their	being	forced	to	emigrate	arose	after	the	attack	by	militants	in	Grozny	
(4/5	December	2014);	http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/253822/.	Kadyrov	
then	announced	a	crackdown,	repeatedly	upholding	his	decision	in	inter-
views	with	Russian	 journalists.	Kadyrov’s	action	was	de facto	 supported	
by	President	Putin,	who	when	asked	about	the	issue	said	that	even	though	
Kadyrov	should	obey	the	law,	the	use	of	non-standard	measures	in	the	fight	
against	terrorism	is	justified,	as	in	Israel,	so	in	Chechnya.	See	https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=QeS-vfCQVdE
24	 Kadyrov’s	statement	was	a	response	to	the	special	operation	conducted	in	
Chechen	on	19	April	2015	by	Interior	Ministry	troops	of	the	Stavropol	krai	and	
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Republican	institutions	(ministries,	branches	of	federal	agencies,	
local	 administration	 etc.),	while	maintaining	 outward	 forms	 of	
compliance	with	the	Russian	legal	system,	in	fact	operate	on	the	
basis	of	local,	informal	arrangements	and	customs.	Their	loyalty	
to	the	federal	authorities,	which	monitor	their	activities	to	only	
a	limited	extent,	is	also	questionable,	as	they	know	about	the	real	
situation	on	the	ground.	Their	actual	superior	 is	Ramzan	Kady-
rov,	who	as	head	of	the	republic	does	not	formally	exercise	super-
visory	 functions	 over	many	 of	 them	 (except	 for	 the	 republican	
Federal	Security	Service,	which	the	Kremlin	has	left	in	Russian	
hands,	although	it	has	little	opportunity	to	influence	the	Chechen	
authorities).	The	most	conspicuous	example	is	the	Chechen	pow-
er	structures,	including	the	Chechen	police,	who	while	formally	
part	of	the	federal	system	are	in	fact	subject	to	Kadyrov.	Their	au-
tonomy	and	arbitrariness	are	great	enough	that	they	can	be	de-
scribed	as	a	Chechen	army.
A	factor	contributing	to	the	processes	described	herein	has	been	
the	 consistent	 Chechenisation	 of	 the	 personnel	 in	 the	 republic	
over	the	last	fifteen	years,	as	approved	of	by	the	Kremlin:	while	
in	the	early	years	of	the	Kadyrovs’	rule	most	key	positions	in	the	
Chechen	administration	were	held	by	Russians,	who	were	either	
local	or	drafted	in	from	other	regions	of	the	Russian	Federation,	
almost	 all	 these	 positions	 are	 now	 held	 by	 Chechens	 –	 people	
loyal	to	Kadyrov.	A	large	part,	if	not	the	majority,	of	members	of	
law	enforcement	agencies	are	 former	guerrillas	who	only	a	 few	
years	ago	were	fighting	against	the	Russians.	On	the	other	hand,	
many	officials	 (including	 senior	ones)	 are	young	people	who	do	
not	remember	the	Soviet	era	and	were	brought	up	in	a	hermetic	
Chechen	culture,	for	whom	Russia,	Russian	culture,	and	the	Rus-
sian	mentality	are	alien	concepts.
the	Russian	military	base	in	Khankala.	During	the	action,	which	was	prob-
ably	carried	out	without	the	knowledge	of	the	Chechen	authorities,	a	certain	
Jambulat	Dadayev,	a	Chechen	sought	under	an	arrest	warrant,	was	shot.	See	
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dHu6AOLz7zI
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Kadyrov	has	demonstratively	broken	with	the	Ichkerian	past	and	
its	symbolism,	but	his	internal	policy	as	tolerated	by	the	Kremlin	
is	leading	to	the	effective	construction	of	ideological,	institutional	
and	personnel	bases	 for	Chechen	statehood	 (although	 it	 is	diffi-
cult	to	say	to	what	extent	this	is	a	deliberate	and	planned	action).	
In	 the	 Chechens’	 recent	 history,	 they	 have	made	 two	 attempts	
to	 found	an	 independent	 state:	 in	 1991-1994	and	 1996-1999.	Both	
ended	in	failure,	not	only	as	a	result	of	Russian	military	interven-
tion,	but	also	because	of	 the	 inability	of	Chechnya’s	 society	and	
elites	to	lay	the	foundations	to	form	a	state	(a	functioning	admin-
istration,	 guarantees	 of	 personal	 security,	 a	 functioning	 econo-
my,	etc.),	which	led	to	a	double	transformation	of	Chechnya	into	
a	 ‘black	 hole’	 (an	 area	 uncontrolled	 by	 any	 authority,	 and	with	
a	developed	system	of	organised	crime).	Meanwhile,	under	Kady-
rov	(and	financed	by	Moscow),	the	administration	in	Chechnya	is	
functional,	 the	authorities	provide	stability	and	order,	and	spe-
cific	Chechen	bureaucrats	and	officials	are	gaining	experience	in	
the	administration	of	the	republic,	which	may	prove	useful	in	the	
event	of	a	hypothetical	return	to	the	idea	of		independence.
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III. ramzan Kadyrov: PuTIn’s ProblemaTIc 
buT useful vassal
1. Kadyrov’s activity: political ambitions and feudal logic
Having	disposed	of	his	most	dangerous	opponents	and	strength-
ened	his	power	in	Chechnya,	Ramzan	Kadyrov	began	to	play	a	po-
litical	 game	 that	 goes	 beyond	 Chechnya.	 One	 of	 the	most	 spec-
tacular	manifestations	of	Kadyrov’s	activity	was	the	participation	
of	 troops	 from	 Chechen	 armed	 formations	 in	 armed	 conflicts	
outside	the	borders	of	Chechnya,	in	Georgia	in	2008	(the	‘Vostok’	
battalion,	which	was	disbanded	a	year	later25)	and	in	Crimea	and	
the	Donbas	in	2014-2015	(Chechens	serving	in	various	armed	for-
mations	subordinate	 to	Kadyrov26).	Kadyrov	has	also	repeatedly	
declared	his	willingness	to	let	groups	loyal	to	him	combat	terror-
ist	threats	across	Russia,	including	in	the	neighbouring	republics	
of	the	Caucasus	(the	Kremlin	blocked	attempts	to	carry	out	anti-
terrorist	actions	in	Ingushetia	and	Dagestan,	for	fear	of	negative	
reaction	from	the	elites	and	societies	of	these	republics).
Another	 equally	 spectacular	 example	 of	 Kadyrov’s	 political	 ac-
tivity	 is	 the	demonstrations	 of	his	 own	power	which	he	 organ-
ises.	 In	December	2014	a	 rally	was	held	at	a	 stadium	 in	Grozny,	
during	 which	 around	 ten	 to	 twenty	 thousand	 armed	 troops	 of	
25	 http://www.vesti.ru/doc.html?id=201122&cid=1
26	 Some	of	them	travelled	to	Ukraine	voluntarily,	others	were	probably	led	by	
commanders.	The	Kadyrovtsy	(probably	a	few	hundred	people)	have	partici-
pated	in	all	the	major	military	operations	in	Donbas.	In	the	spring	of	2015,	
however,	the	process	of	withdrawing	them	from	Ukraine	was	begun,	which	
seems	to	have	been	the	result	of	concessions	made	by	the	Kremlin	to	the	
Russian	power	structures,	who	were	dissatisfied	at	Kadyrov’s	growing	in-
fluence	(http://nv.ua/publications/pochemu-kadyrovcy-ushli-is	-dnr-and-
LNR-45671.html).	For	more	on	 the	Kadyrovtsy	 in	Ukraine,	 see	e.g.	http://
korrespondent.net/ukraine/3454071-chechentsy-rasskazaly-skolko-ykh-
vouiet-na-donbasse;	http://gordonua.com/news/war/Doklad-Nemcova-Na-
Donbasse-voyuyut-kadyrovcy-80544.html	Chechens	also	took	fought	in	the	
Donbas	on	the	Ukrainian	side,	though	less	frequently	(for	example	the	so-
called	Jokhar	Dudayev	Battalion	led	by	Isa	Munayev).
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the	Chechen	security	structures	swore	an	 ‘oath	of	allegiance’	 to	
President	Putin,	while	Kadyrov	declared	 that	 the	Chechens	 are	
ready	to	obey	every	order	from	the	Russian	President,	and	to	de-
fend	the	interests	of	Russia	wherever	it	is	needed27.	Meanwhile	in	
January	2015	Kadyrov	organised	a	demonstration	by	several	hun-
dred	thousand	people	in	Grozny	in	connection	with	the	attack	on	
the	office	of	Charlie Hebdo,	during	which	the	insult	to	the	religious	
feelings	of	Muslims	was	condemned	(the	rally	was	attended	not	
only	by	inhabitants	of	Chechnya,	but	also	of	Ingushetia	and	Dag-
estan,	as	well	as	several	Russian	Muslim	leaders28).
The	Chechen	leader	also	comments	actively	on	the	political	situ-
ation	in	Russia	(he	supports	President	Putin	unconditionally	and	
criticises	 the	 opposition29),	 the	 situation	 in	 the	post-Soviet	 area	
(mainly	in	criticism	of	the	‘fascist’	regime	in	Kiev,	and	his	cocky	
declarations	of	his	personal	involvement	in	the	Donbas30)	and	the	
international	situation	(usually	in	an	anti-Western	spirit),	includ-
ing	the	Middle	East	(for	example,	critique	of	the	Islamic	State	and	
the	US’s	Middle	Eastern	policy).	Regularly	and	most	pompously,	
Kadyrov	also	reasserts	his	own	loyalty	to	President	Putin	(for	ex-
ample,	before	the	end	of	Putin’s	second	term	in	2008,	he	expressed	
the	opinion	that	Putin	should	be	president	for	life	of	the	Russian	
Federation31;	Kadyrov	has	also	 reiterated	 that	he	 is	 ready	 to	not	
27	 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6NAIrcAPbuA
28	 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Gm5jLIqYdO4
29	 One	very	skilful	gambit	by	Kadyrov	was	his	criticism	of	Mikhail	Khodor-
kovsky	for	his	statements	concerning	the	murder	of	the	editors	of	Charlie 
Hebdo	(Khodorkovsky	called	on	the	world’s	media	to	publish	the	Muham-
mad	cartoons	in	solidarity	with	the	French	newspaper).	Commenting	on	the	
statement	by	the	former	Russian	oligarch,	Kadyrov	called	him	an	enemy	of	
all	Muslims	and	his	personal	enemy;	http://lifenews.ru/news/148124.	With	
this	declaration,	he	gained	both	in	the	eyes	of	Muslims	(as	a	defender	of	Mu-
hammad)	and	President	Putin	(thanks	to	his	criticism	of	the	West	and	Kho-
dorkovsky).
30	 For	example	see	http://www.ntv.ru/novosti/1277258,	https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=7yO3Z6y_63g;	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cEmbR4eBdaM
31	 http://www.newsru.com/arch/russia/02oct2007/oputine.html
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only	carry	out	every	order	Putin	gives,	but	to	lay	down	his	own	
life	for	him32).
One	extremely	important	and	skilfully	played	area	of	the	Chech-
en	leader’s	activity	is	his	use	of	propaganda,	which	builds	up	his	
image	as	a	strong,	religious	politician,	fanatically	faithful	to	the	
Russian	 president,	 but	 still	 with	 his	 own,	 often	 controversial	
opinions,	as	both	a	Chechen	and	Russian	patriot.	Kadyrov	is	very	
active	on	social	media	(mainly	through	his	own	profile	on	the	In-
stagram	site33),	and	constantly	appears	in	the	Russian	mass	me-
dia	(he	frequently	participates	in	talk	shows,	gives	interviews	to	
journalists,	invites	them	to	Chechnya).	The	Chechen	leader’s	pres-
ence	in	the	media	is	not	only	political	in	nature;	Kadyrov	can	be	
described	as	a	Chechen	and	Russian	popular	celebrity.	He	attracts	
attention	 by	 inviting	well-known	public	 figures	 to	 the	 republic	
(athletes,	actors,	singers)	from	Russia	and	abroad	(including	Mike	
Tyson,	Gerard	Depardieu,	and	Vanessa	Mae);	he	promotes	healthy	
living	(sports,	struggle	with	alcoholism	and	drug	addiction,	etc.),	
and	 ‘traditional’	 Chechen	 and	 Islamic	 values.	 It	 is	 important	 to	
note	here	that	Kadyrov	is	presented	mostly	positively	in	the	Rus-
sian	media,	and	he	is	seen	as	such	by	many	Russians	(despite	the	
fact	that	Chechens	generally	have	a	negative	image	in	Russia)34.
Kadyrov	has	also	established	international	contacts,	mainly	in	the	
countries	of	the	Middle	East:	he	meets	local	politicians,	business-
men,	religious	activists,	pays	visits	to	Middle	Eastern	countries35	
32	 http://lenta.ru/news/2015/03/10/kadyrov/
33	 https://instagram.com/kadyrov_95/
34	 As	many	as	55%	of	respondents	who	took	part	in	the	Levada	Centre	poll	of	
March	2015	stated	that	Ramzan	Kadyrov	is	a	politician	who	can	be	trusted,	
and	35%	felt	sympathy	and	respect	towards	him.	See	http://www.levada.
ru/31-03-2015/blagopoluchnoi-i-spokoinoi-situatsiyu-na-severnoi-kavkaze-
schitayut-54-rossiyan
35	 For	example,	Saudi	Arabia	in	August	2007	(http://www.pravda.ru/news/
politics/13-08-2007/234903-kadirov-0/),	the	United	Arab	Emirates	in	March	
2011	(http:	//	www.yuga.ru/news/221693/),	and	in	Jordan	in	March	2014	(http://	
chechnyatoday.com/content/view/277959).
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and	welcomes	guests	on	their	return	visits	to	his	region36.	Increas-
ingly,	Grozny	 is	 establishing	direct	 cooperation	with	near-East-
ern	countries,	primarily	in	the	economic	sphere	(mainly	Middle	
Eastern	investments	in	Chechnya37).
The	Chechen	leader	is	primarily	motivated	by	his	great	personal	
ambitions	–	the	desire	to	transform	himself	from	a	local	to	a	fed-
eral	politician	(which	he	has	succeeded	in	achieving38),	the	leader	
of	the	North	Caucasus,	and	also	of	all	Russian	Muslims.	However,	
Kadyrov	 is	 also	 directed	 by	 the	 logic	 of	 the	 vassal,	who	 is	 con-
tinually	forced	to	demonstrate	his	usefulness	to	his	superior	(the	
Russian	president),	as	well	as	by	the	fear	of	his	own	people.	From	
this	perspective,	the	aim	of	the	Chechen	leader’s	political	and	me-
dia	activity	is	simply	to	survive,	retain	his	position,	keep	control	
of	 the	republic	and	his	own	people,	 and	hold	onto	 the	 favour	of	
President	Putin.	The	alternative	 is,	at	best,	his	political	non-ex-
istence	or	exile,	and	at	worst	–	although	considering	the	nature	
of	the	Caucasus,	the	most	probable	–	the	loss	of	his	own	life	and	
an	existential	threat	to	his	entire	clan.	Kadyrov	is	forced	to	con-
stantly	prove	his	loyalty,	irreplaceability	and	usefulness,	by	sys-
tematically	rendering	a	kind	of	‘homage’	to	Vladimir	Putin	(send-
ing	Chechen	troops	to	the	Donbas,	 joining	in	with	anti-Western	
criticism,	swearing	oaths	of	fidelity,	etc.).	Meanwhile,	he	uses	the	
‘carrot	and	stick’	method	against	his	own	people:	terrorising	the	
rebellious	and	manipulating	the	rest.	Both	audiences	need	dem-
36	 For	 example,	 King	 Abdullah	 II	 of	 Jordan	 (http://www.eer.ru/a/article/
u145/19-06-2014/22229),	a	delegation	from	Kuwait	(http://chechnyatoday.
com/content/view/274616),	and	representatives	of	the	Iranian	Parliament	
(http://www.regnum.ru/news/polit/1860425.html).
37	 See	 for	 example	 http://www.islamnews.ru/news-439148.html;	 http://
kavpolit.com/articles/arabskij_prints_postroit_v_groznom_otel_za_120_
mln-2566/;	http://chechnyatoday.com/content/view/276982;	http://www.
vestikavkaza.ru/news/Zhurnalisty-iz-Kuveyta-i-Livana-nakhodyatsya-s-
visitom-v-Chechne.html;	http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/242803/
38	 For	example,	according	to	polls	conducted	by	the	Agency	for	Political	and	Eco-
nomic	Communications	in	June	2015,	Kadyrov	came	second	(after	the	mayor	
of	Moscow	Sergei	Sobianin)	in	the	ranking	of	the	most	influential	regional	
leaders	in	Russia;	http://www.chechnya.gov.ru/page.php?r=126&id=16680
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onstrations	of	force:	Putin’s	belief	in	Kadyrov’s	trustworthiness	is	
thus	reinforced,	as	is	that	of	Chechen	society	in	the	futility	of	any	
resistance.
A	classic	example	of	the	Chechen	leader’s	behaviour	in	accordance	
with	this	scheme	was	his	reaction	to	the	militant	attack	in	Grozny	
in	early	December	201439:	a	clearly	concerned	Kadyrov	ordered	the	
immediate	liquidation	of	the	militants	regardless	of	the	loss	of	life	
(as	a	result	of	the	chaotic	fighting,	as	many	as	14	Chechen	troops	
were	killed	and	36	were	injured),	after	which	he	immediately	sub-
mitted	a	report	to	President	Putin.	After	the	action	he	announced	
a	crackdown	on	the	militants’	relatives;	later	a	video	appeared	on	
the	 Internet	 in	which	Kadyrov	negotiates	with	 the	militants	by	
telephone,	trying	–	using	an	Islamic	argument	–	to	prove	to	them	
that	they	were	in	error	and	should	lay	down	their	arms40.	A	few	
weeks	later	(28	December),	Kadyrov	organised	a	parade	in	Grozny	
of	local	troops,	which	can	be	read	as	a	demonstration	of	his	own	
power	after	the	militants’	attack.
2. moscow’s problem with Kadyrov
Kadyrov’s	 independence	 and	 arbitrary	 behaviour	 in	 Chechnya,	
his	open	disregard	for	Russian	legislation	and	the	federal	authori-
ties,	and	the	activity	of	the	Chechen	leader	and	his	men	beyond	
the	borders	 of	 the	 republic,	 are	 the	 object	 of	 frequent	 criticism	
from	the	Russian	elite	(in	both	the	ruling	and	opposition	camps),	
as	 has	 been	 manifested	 in	 numerous	 publications	 and	 state-
ments	by	 journalists	 and	 experts,	 and	 in	 increasingly	open	 (by	
39	 A	group	of	more	than	a	dozen	fighters	of	the	Caucasus	Emirate	stormed	into	
the	city	centre	on	the	night	of	4/5	December	2014,	shooting	several	Chechen	
policemen.	They	split	 into	 two	groups	and	barricaded	 themselves	 in	 the	
Press	House	and	a	school	in	the	centre	of	Grozny.	After	several	hours	of	fierce	
fighting,	Chechen	government	forces	killed	all	11	attackers.	After	the	action	
a	video	appeared	online	in	which	the	militants	justified	their	action	as	re-
venge	for	the	persecution	of	Muslims	and	the	humiliation	of	Muslim	women	
by	the	Kadyrovtsy;	http://checheninfo.com/2015/05/09/204/
40	 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_QF-TgG1Zus
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the	Russian	 opposition)	 or	 covert	 criticism	 (by	 the	 authorities).	
Both	liberals	and	many	pro-government	politicians	and	experts	
see	Kadyrov	as	‘the	reincarnation	of	Dudayev’,	a	politician	who	in	
the	right	conditions	could	openly	work	against	Moscow,	and	who	
blackmails	the	Russian	authorities	to	force	them	into	further	con-
cessions.	 Some	 commentators	 even	 claim	 that	Kadyrov	 and	 the	
Chechen	armed	formations	subordinate	to	him	have	become	one	
of	the	most	important	forces	on	the	Russian	political	scene,	and	
that	in	the	future	the	Chechen	leader	could	take	up	a	position	in	
the	federal	authorities41.	Some	believe	that	this	threatens	a	kind	
of	‘Chechenisation’	of	Russia,	that	is,	the	introduction	of	a	cruel,	
authoritarian	regime	on	the	Chechen	model42.
Ramzan	Kadyrov’s	principal	and	most	serious	opponents	are	the	
Russian	 power	 structures	 (including	 the	 Interior	Ministry,	 the	
Federal	Security	Service,	and	the	federal	army),	which	since	the	
beginning	have	been	consistent	opponents	of	the	Chechenisation	
policy,	seeing	Ahmad	and	Ramzan	Kadyrov	as	covert	separatists.	
The	 ‘siloviki,’	 who	 lost	 their	 dominant	 position	 in	 the	 republic	
as	a	result	of	the	Chechenisation	policy,	are	irritated	not	only	by	
Kadyrov’s	arbitrary	rule	of	the	republic	and	the	desire	to	sanction	
his	unwritten	monopoly	on	the	use	of	violence	in	Chechnya.	The	
basis	for	their	criticism	is	the	special	status	Kadyrov	enjoys	in	the	
Russian	political	 system,	 that	 is,	his	effective	subordination	ex-
clusively	and	directly	to	President	Putin,	bypassing	the	federal	of-
fices	which	he	ostentatiously	ignores.	The	power	structures	per-
ceive	Kadyrov’s	political	activity	(his	demonstrations	of	strength,	
his	statements	to	the	media,	building	up	his	own	position	by	send-
ing	Chechen	soldiers	to	the	Donbas,	etc.)	as	openly	defiant	of	and	
threatening	to	their	own	positions,	interests	and	prestige.
41	 See	 for	 example	http://ria.ru/politics/20150424/1060761226.html,	 http://
www.alaniatv.com/dolzhnostj-dlya-kadjyrova-v-mide.html
42	 See	for	example	http://www.svoboda.org/content/transcript/26586985.html;	
http://www.zvezda.ru/politics/2007/04/08/kadyrov.htm;	https://www.you-
tube.com/watch?v=TIYe-46LsY8;	http://www.politcom.ru/article.php?id=4243;	
http://polit.ru/article/2004/03/24/lokshina/
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Particularly	dangerous	 from	 the	power	 structures’	point	of	view	
(mainly	the	special	services)	is	the	expansion	of	Chechen	business	
controlled	by	Kadyrov	–	both	legal,	but	especially	illegal	–	through-
out	the	Russian	Federation,	as	well	as	outside	its	borders	(including	
occupied	Crimea43).	Gangs	controlled	by	Kadyrov,	and	beyond	the	
control	of	the	Russian	special	services,	are	mainly	engaged	in	ex-
tortion	from	businesses	(along	the	lines	of	the	Chechen	organised	
crime	syndicates	operating	in	Russia	in	the	1990s)44.	The	legality	of	
the	 funding	and	 functioning	of	 the	Ahmad	Kadyrov	Foundation,	
which	 conducts	 extensive	 activities	 in	Chechnya,	Russia	 and	be-
yond,	is	also	highly	questionable.	Grozny’s	contacts	with	the	Chech-
en	diaspora	abroad	(Europe,	the	former	Soviet	Union,	the	Middle	
East),	 including	via	unofficial	representatives	of	Kadyrov	in	indi-
vidual	countries	(for	example	France	or	Ukraine),	are	also	seen	as	
encroaching	on	the	territory	of	the	Russian	special	services.
The	lawlessness	of	Chechen	power	structures	beyond	the	borders	
of	the	republic	is	also	unacceptable	to	the	federal	‘siloviki’,	mainly	
their	alleged	role	in	a	series	of	killings	in	Russia	(such	as	those	of	
Anna	Politkovskaya45;	the	Russian	officer	Yuri	Budanov,	who	was	
given	a	prison	sentence	for	 the	brutal	murder	of	a	Chechen	girl	
in	200046;	and	many	Chechen	activists	opposed	to	Kadyrov,	such	
as	Sulim	and	Ruslan	Yamadayev47).	The	conflict	between	Kadyrov	
and	 the	 ‘siloviki’	 exploded	 into	 public	 view	 thanks	 to	 one	 such	
killing	 –	 that	 of	 the	 Russian	 oppositionist	 Boris	 Nemtsov	 (who	
was	gunned	down	in	Moscow	on	27	February	2015),	which	subor-
dinates	of	Kadyrov	were	accused	of	organising	(the	prime	suspect	
43	 http://www.bigcaucasus.com/events/topday/17-03-2014/89593-krim-0/;	
http://news.liga.net/news/politics/1823609-.putin_otdal_krym_kavka-
zskomu_kriminalitetu_informsoprotivlenthat	is.htm
44	 According	 to	 reports	 in	 the	 Russian	 media,	 Kadyrov’s	 bodyguards	
were	 involved	 in	 criminal	 activity	 in	 Moscow;	 http://www.pravda-tv.
ru/2013/03/26/23236
45	 http://www.newsru.com/arch/russia/09oct2006/novaya.html;	http://echo.
msk.ru/blog/a_goldfarb/1327160-echo/
46	 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KFsWtc1Ayiw
47	 http://region.urfo.org/incidents/280100.html
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is	 Zaur	 Dadayev,	 a	 high-ranking	 officer	 in	 the	 Chechen	 ‘Sever’	
battalion48).
The	 conflict	 between	 Kadyrov	 and	 the	 federal	 power	 structures	
poses	a	challenge	to	the	domestic	policy	of	President	Putin,	whose	
regime	is	based	on	the	special	services,	and	whose	system	for	rul-
ing	Chechnya	is	based	on	Ramzan	Kadyrov.	Putin	faces	the	follow-
ing	dilemma:	he	cannot	deprive	the	Chechen	leader	of	his	position	
as	 this	would	destabilise	 the	situation	 in	Chechnya;	however,	 ig-
noring	the	interests	of	the	power	structures	would	undermine	his	
own	power.	This	forces	Putin	to	try	to	defuse	tensions	between	the	
Russian	‘siloviki’	and	Kadyrov	by	encouraging	both	sides	to	make	
tactical	compromises,	a	method	which	is	usually	successful49.
Although	the	above	issue	is	a	significant	problem	for	Vladimir	Pu-
tin	in	managing	the	political	system,	the	risks	posed	by	Kadyrov	
to	Russia	and	President	Putin	personally	have	been	exaggerated	
(possibly	 as	 a	 result	 of	 propaganda	 activities	 by	 the	 ‘siloviki’),	
and	it	does	not	seem	justified	to	treat	Kadyrov	as	a	challenge	to	
the	Russian	authorities	in	the	Caucasus,	or	as	a	potential	leader	
of	the	Chechens’	next	revolt	against	Moscow.	Although	Kadyrov	
is	independent,	ambitious,	and	exercises	full	authority	in	the	re-
public,	 the	stability	of	which	largely	depends	on	his	continued	
rule,	he	remains	Putin’s	vassal,	and	his	regime	is	fully	depend-
ent	on	Russia	both	financially	and	politically.	Nor	does	it	seem	
likely	–	due	to	resistance	among	the	Russian	elite	–	that	Kadyrov	
will	be	promoted	or	take	up	a	high	position	in	the	federal	gov-
ernment.	Furthermore,	there	is	no	indication	that	the	Chechen	
leader	aspires	to	such	a	position	himself,	because	it	would	mean	
48	 http://lenta.ru/news/2015/03/13/kadyrov_dadaev/
49	 According	to	Russian	media,	examples	of	tactical	compromise	between	the	
‘siloviki’	and	Kadyrov	include	the	latter’s	meeting	with	Nikolai	Patrush-
ev,	the	head	of	the	National	Security	Council	(March	2015,	http://polit.ru/
news/2015/03/11/kadyrov_patrushev/),	and	Igor	Sechin,	president	of	Ros-
neft	(June	2015,	http://kavpolit.com/articles/o_chem_dogovorilis_sechin_i_
kadyrov-17718/).
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his	effective	demotion	by	depriving	him	of	support	from	the	ter-
ritory	and	the	military	units	which	are	loyal	to	him.
The	 risk	 of	 Kadyrov	 openly	 rebelling	 against	 Moscow	 is	 also	
minimal	 because	 of	 how	 the	 Chechen	 people	 themselves	 per-
ceive	 him.	 Chechen	 society,	 tired	 of	 long-term	war	 and	 terror-
ised	by	Kadyrov’s	people,	 is	 forced	 to	 tolerate	his	authority.	The	
people	appreciate	the	stability,	the	reconstruction	of	the	republic	
and	the	 improvement	of	 the	economic	situation	under	Kadyrov.	
Many,	 especially	 young	Chechens,	 are	 also	 impressed	 by	Kady-
rov’s	strength,	determination	and	lifestyle	(including	his	ostenta-
tious	religiosity),	in	large	part	because	of	his	effective	propagan-
da.	However,	Kadyrov	labours	under	the	indelible	mark	of	being	
a	collaborator,	a	traitor	to	his	own	people,	and	of	denying	his	his-
tory	and	the	struggle	for	 independence	against	Russia.	 It	 is	also	
relevant	that	against	the	backdrop	of	Chechen	history,	Kadyrov’s	
dictatorship	and	cult	of	personality	represent	a	distortion	and	de-
nial	of	 the	Chechen	history	and	mentality	(Chechen	society	has	
always	been	marked	by	strong	egalitarianism;	there	were	no	dic-
tatorial	periods	in	the	history	of	Chechnya,	and	the	social	order	
was	based	not	on	a	political	power	governing	with	a	criminal	code	
and	a	monopoly	on	violence,	but	on	customary	law	and	relations	
between	families	and	clans	of	equals).	In	traditional	Chechen	so-
ciety,	moreover,	 issues	 of	honour	 (especially	 that	 of	 the	 family)	
and	the	duty	to	declare	vendettas	against	injustice	were	of	great	
importance.	Kadyrov	and	his	men	have	been	committing	crimes	
against	 thousands	of	Chechens	 for	years.	The	 immediate	 threat	
to	the	Chechen	leader	and	his	clan	comes	not	only	from	his	politi-
cal	opponents,	but	also	from	his	personal	enemies	who,	because	of	
the	circumstances,	must	postpone	taking	their	compulsory	act	of	
revenge	to	a	more	favourable	moment.
3. Kadyrov’s usefulness
Moscow	must	pay	a	high	price	for	the	stability	in	Chechnya	and	
meeting	 the	 conditions	 of	 the	 Putin–Kadyrov	 pact	 (the	 need	 to	
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retain	 Chechnya,	 conceding	 its	 civilisational	 distancing	 itself	
from	Russia,	etc.)	and	must	bear	specific	risks	(primarily	related	
to	Kadyrov’s	activities	outside	Chechnya	and	his	conflict	with	the	
federal	power	structures).	 In	the	Kremlin’s	perception,	 the	pro-
cesses	taking	place	in	Chechnya	(its	distancing	itself	from	Russia),	
although	 they	adversely	affect	 the	 integrity	of	 the	Russian	Fed-
eration	and	reduce	 its	 internal	cohesion	and	security,	have	now	
become	irreversible	(Chechnya	will	never	become	a	‘normal’	part	
of	Russia).	Besides,	similar	trends	(Islamisation,	de-Russification	
etc.),	albeit	not	on	such	a	 large	scale,	have	also	occurred	in	oth-
er	 Caucasian	 republics	 (especially	 in	Dagestan	 and	 Ingushetia),	
which	also	–	like	Chechnya	–	are	supported	by	the	federal	budget.	
In	many	cases,	federal	law	does	not	operate	in	other	parts	of	the	
Russian	Federation,	and	so	lawlessness	on	the	Caucasian	periph-
ery,	a	region	often	described	as	the	‘internal	abroad’,	is	not	seen	
as	a	serious	problem.	In	addition,	Russia’s	policy	towards	the	post-
Soviet	 area	 indicates	 that	Russian	elites	do	not	 see	 the	problem	
of	 internal	 separatism	as	a	 serious,	present	 threat.	Moscow	has	
inspired	and	exploited	separatist	tendencies	in	its	own	imperial	
policy	for	many	years,	actively	and	without	fear	of	domestic	re-
percussions,	 including	 separatism	 in	 the	 Caucasus	 (including	
Abkhazia,	South	Ossetia,	northern	Azerbaijan,	 the	Georgian	 Ja-
vakheti,	as	well	as	Ukraine	and	Central	Asia).	The	biggest	prob-
lems	 are	 generated	 by	 the	 conflicts	 between	 Kadyrov	 and	 the	
federal	power	structures,	but	even	these	do	not	risk	Grozny	re-
nouncing	its	obedience	to	Moscow.
The	Kadyrov	problem	is	superseded	by	his	usefulness,	which	goes	
beyond	simply	guaranteeing	stability	in	Chechnya.	Kadyrov	and	
the	armed	forces	he	controls	are	a	convenient	tool	 in	the	Krem-
lin’s	hands	for	its	domestic	policy,	as	well	as	in	the	framework	of	
wider	Russian	policy	towards	the	post-Soviet	region	and	the	Mid-
dle	East.
Regarding	the	internal	situation	and	the	policy	towards	the	post-
Soviet	area,	Kadyrov	and	his	people	serve	as	a	deterrent	against	
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both	domestic	opponents	(for	example,	the	ability	to	use	his	troops	
to	 pacify	 anti-Putin	demonstrations)	 and	 external	 ones	 (mostly	
in	the	post-Soviet	area).	The	use	of	the	Chechen	factor	is	possible	
in	that	capacity	because	of	the	bad	reputation	and	negative	con-
notations	which	Chechens	have	in	the	eyes	of	the	majority	of	the	
population	of	the	former	USSR.	They	are	commonly	seen	as	ruth-
less,	 cruel,	 rebellious,	 lacking	any	 fear	of	 consequences,	 closed-
off,	with	an	incomprehensible	culture	and	mentality.	They	arouse	
popular	 resentment	 and	 fear.	 This	 deep-rooted	 image,	which	 is	
derived	from	the	nineteenth-century	Caucasian	wars,	was	rein-
forced	by	the	bloody	events	in	Chechnya	after	the	collapse	of	the	
USSR	(both	real	and	those	created	by	Russian	propaganda),	and	is	
confirmed	today	by	Ramzan	Kadyrov	through	his	actual	and	me-
dia	activities.
Chechnya	also	plays	a	certain	role	in	Russian	policy	in	the	Mid-
dle	 East	 and	 the	 Islamic	world.	While	 it	 represented	 a	 problem	
in	Russia’s	relations	with	Islamic	countries	during	the	two	wars	
(the	 elite	 and	publics	 in	 those	 countries	 saw	 the	Chechen	wars	
as	 a	 defensive	 jihad,	 and	 as	 proof	 of	 the	 anti-Islamic	 nature	 of	
Russian	policy),	it	has	now	evolved	into	a	Russian	asset.	This	Is-
lamised	Chechnya,	in	which	sharia	 is	becoming	stronger,	whose	
leader	rebuilds	mosques,	pays	visits	 to	 Islamic	countries,	and	 is	
seeking	investment	from	Gulf	states,	and	defends	the	good	name	
of	Muhammad,	relics	of	whom	he	brought	to	Chechnya	(see	the	
demonstration	 in	Grozny	 in	 January	 2015),	 is	 a	 showcase	 for	 an	
‘Islam-friendly’	Russia,	a	factor	in	the	warming	relations	between	
Moscow	and	Islamic	countries,	leading	away	them	from	the	ideas	
of	supporting	the	armed	underground	resistance	in	the	Caucasus.	
Kadyrov,	who	 is	 anti-Salafi	but	flaunts	his	 religion	 and	 favours	
the	Islamisation	of	his	republic,	may	also	be	presented	by	Russia	
as	a	 ‘good’	Muslim,	who	in	the	name	of	God	and	under	the	Rus-
sian	standard	fights	the	‘greatest	evil	in	the	world’	–	terrorism50.	
50	 Moscow	has	even	sent	Chechens	to	security	cooperation	with	Middle	East-
ern	countries;	in	2006,	officers	from	the	‘Vostok’	battalion	protected	Rus-
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Another	 of	 Kadyrov’s	 advantages	 in	 this	 dimension	 is	 his	 ex-
tremely	anti-Western	views,	which	he	parades	every	day.
sian	engineers	involved	in	the	reconstruction	of	Lebanon	after	the	war	with	
Israel	(http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/710391),	and	in	2015	representatives	
of	Chechen	armed	formations	took	part	in	anti-terrorist	exercises	in	Jordan	
for	the	first	time	(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Raly51pEZ_w).
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Iv. The sysTemIc Problem wITh chechnya
The	activity	of	Ramzan	Kadyrov,	his	growing	ambition	and	arbi-
trariness,	his	expanding	conflicts	with	the	federal	power	struc-
tures,	his	strong	personification	of	the	system	of	government	in	
Chechnya	–	these	are	all	major	concerns	for	the	Russian	authori-
ties,	and	are	increasingly	affecting	the	stability	of	Putin’s	political	
system.	They	do	not	in	themselves	constitute	a	threat	to	the	ter-
ritorial	integrity	of	the	Russian	Federation,	however,	because	the	
danger	of	Kadyrov	openly	rebelling	against	Moscow,	upon	which	
his	power	in	Chechnya	depends,	is	minimal.
However,	 the	 broader	 problem	 of	 Chechnya	 remains	 a	 serious	
challenge	for	Russia,	a	challenge	which	in	the	future	may	signifi-
cantly	affect	the	cohesion	of	the	state	and	its	internal	security,	and	
undermine	its	territorial	integrity.	The	liquidation	of	the	Chech-
en	Republic	of	Ichkeria,	the	crushing	of	the	armed	underground	
resistance	in	the	republic	and	its	stability	under	Kadyrov	do	not	
mean	 that	a	 solution	 to	 the	problem	of	Chechen	separatism	has	
been	found.	It	has	been	only	temporarily	suspended,	and	relations	
between	Moscow	and	Grozny	–	which	in	the	past	have	often	led	to	
conflict	–	are	currently	based	not	on	a	systemic	solution,	but	on	
the	 superficial	 (and	 inherently	unstable)	 informal	arrangement	
between	 Putin	 and	 Kadyrov,	 which	 is	 underpinned	 by	 a	 tem-
porary	 convergence	 of	 interests	 between	 these	 two	 politicians.	
Under	 favourable	conditions,	 the	 idea	of	 	Chechen	 independence	
could	once	again	re-emerge.
The	 risk	 of	 the	 agreement	 between	Moscow	 and	 Grozny	 being	
broken,	 and	 the	 re-emergence	 of	 Chechen	 pro-independence	
rhetoric,	is	linked	to	the	possible	replacement	of	the	President	of	
Russia	or	 the	 leader	of	Chechnya	 (although	 this	 seems	unlikely	
during	the	reign	of	Putin,	it	cannot	be	ruled	out	that	for	example	
Kadyrov	could	resign	under	pressure	 from	the	 ‘siloviki’,	or	 that	
he	could	be	assassinated).	However,	since	the	costs	of	such	devel-
opments	would	be	extremely	high	for	both	parties	(for	Russia	it	
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would	mean	 the	destabilisation	of	Chechnya,	 and	 for	Chechnya	
the	end	of	funding	from	the	Russian	budget	and	the	republic’s	re-
pacification	by	federal	troops),	this	seems	unrealistic	(the	succes-
sors	to	both	politicians	would	probably	strive	to	prolong	the	agree-
ment	between	Grozny	and	Moscow).	In	particular,	it	seems	very	
unlikely	that	Kadyrov	would	repudiate	his	allegiance	to	Moscow,	
as	 in	such	a	situation	his	chances	of	remaining	 in	power	would	
be	minimal	(due	to	his	low	public	support).	Such	a	step	would	be	
an	act	of	desperation,	which	could	perhaps	arise	 from	attempts	
to	remove	him	as	a	result	of	manoeuvring	by	the	federal	power	
structures.
A	potential	political	and	economic	crisis	in	Russia	carries	with	it	
a	much	higher	risk,	as	this	would	lead	to	the	weakening	of	Russian	
control	over	 the	Caucasus	 (including	 the	need	 to	suspend	fund-
ing	from	Moscow,	and	the	reduction	or	withdrawal	of	the	Russian	
military	presence).	Such	a	development	would	most	likely	mean	
a	reactivation	of	the	idea	of	Chechnya’s	independence,	and	revive	
the	rebellion	by	Chechens	against	Russia.	 It	would	also	pose	an	
existential	threat	to	Ramzan	Kadyrov	himself;	the	weakening	of	
Russian	power	in	the	Caucasus	would	most	likely	lead	to	the	cur-
rent	regime	in	Grozny	being	swept	away,	and	a	bloody	settling	of	
accounts,	not	just	with	Kadyrov	himself	but	with	his	entire	clan.	
This	scenario	is	also	most	likely	if	Kadyrov	attempts	to	take	over	
the	 pro-independence	 rhetoric	 for	 himself	 and	 lead	 a	 national	
liberation	movement	 in	 the	situation	of	a	disintegrating	Russia.	
Thus,	there	is	little	chance	that	Kadyrov	would	benefit	politically	
from	having	laid	(consciously	or	not)	the	foundations	for	possible	
future	Chechen	statehood.
Russia’s	loss	of	control	over	the	Caucasus	and	the	reactivation	of	
the	idea	of		Chechen	independence	would	probably	submerge	the	
republic	in	internal	clashes	and	chaos,	as	well	as	the	outbreak	of	
ethnic	 conflicts	 throughout	 the	Caucasus	 (including	Dagestani/
Chechen,	 Ingush/Chechen,	 Ingush/Ossetian	 etc.).	 In	 addition,	
instability	in	the	Caucasus	resulting	from	regional	clashes	could	
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widen	 as	 a	 result	 of	 attempts	 to	 exploit	 the	 region	 in	 domestic	
Russian	 conflicts	 (as	was	 seen	 repeatedly	 during	 the	 1990s,	 for	
example	 Putin’s	 position	 was	 reinforced	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 sec-
ond	Chechen	war).	The	idea	of	 	independence	would	also	have	to	
compete	with	another,	no	less	important	idea	with	equally	strong	
roots	 in	 the	region	–	 that	of	 	establishing	an	 Islamic	state	 in	 the	
North	Caucasus	(today	this	expresses	itself	in	the	idea	promoted	
by	the	Caucasian	Emirate,	and	by	those	armed	forces	operating	in	
the	Caucasus	which	acknowledge	the	sovereignty	of	 the	Islamic	
State).	In	addition	to	clan-,	ethnic-	and	territorial-based	conflicts,	
the	rivalry	 (possibly	armed)	between	these	 two	concepts	would	
become	the	driving	force	behind	developments	in	the	region.
In	the	version	of	events	considered	here,	the	Chechens,	compared	
with	other	northern	Caucasian	nations,	would	certainly	be	much	
better	prepared	to	fight	for	their	independence	and	build	an	inde-
pendent	state	than	they	were	twenty-five	years	ago.	In	addition	to	
their	tradition	of	struggle	for	independence	and	their	pantheon	of	
fallen	heroes,	they	will	have	institutional	support	and	the	experi-
ence	accumulated	by	 the	officials	and	bureaucrats	of	 the	power	
structures	in	Kadyrov’s	Chechnya.	Their	human	capital	and	the	
foreign	contacts	gained	by	 several	hundred	 thousand	Chechens	
living	in	diaspora	abroad,	mainly	in	Europe	and	the	Middle	East,	
could	also	be	of	enormous	importance.	Although	the	Chechen	émi-
grés	are	scattered	around	the	world,	they	maintain	intense,	undi-
minished	contacts	with	each	other	and	with	Chechnya,	and	their	
disunity	and	internal	conflicts	are	compensated	for	by	a	sense	of	
their	own	uniqueness	and	the	deepening	cultural	isolation	of	the	
Chechen	ethnos.
Given	all	these	conditions,	the	reactivation	of	an	open	struggle	by	
the	Chechens	to	create	an	independent	state	(under	the	banners	
of	both	national	 liberation	and	 Islam)	seems	 to	be	 just	a	matter	
of	time,	depending	mostly	on	the	internal	stability	of	the	Russian	
state.	This	is	principally	due	to	the	conditions	in	Chechnya	–	that	
is,	the	strength	and	attractiveness	of	the	idea	of		independence	on	
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the	one	hand,	and	of	jihad	on	the	other	–	as	well	as	the	victims	and	
sacrifices	 that	 the	Chechens	have	suffered	so	 far	 in	 their	strug-
gle	 for	 independence	 from	Russia.	 Such	a	 turn	of	 events	 is	 also	
foreshadowed	by	the	history	of	Russia,	which	is	about	to	confront	
deep	internal	crises	resulting	in	the	weakening	or	loss	of	its	con-
trol	over	the	periphery,	as	well	as	the	present,	deteriorating	state	
of	Russia	itself	(its	rising	political,	economic,	social,	demographic	
and	ethnic	problems).
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